Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) are a formidable cause of nosocomial infections and are considered a serious public health threat due to limited treatment options [1] . The emergence of carbapenem resistance in Enterobacteriaceae is based on the following 2 major mechanisms: plasmid-mediated carbapenemase dissemination acquired through horizontal gene transfer from other bacterial species [2] and modification of porin gene expression due to the acquisition of mutations [3, 4] . CPE outbreaks in hospitals usually have multifactorial origins. Causes include the admission of unrecognized carriers from other hospitals or long-term care facilities, particularly from endemic areas; poor hand hygiene; and ward overcrowding and/or understaffing. Recently, endoscopes have been suggested as point sources of nosocomial Enterobacteriaceae infections [5, 6] .
Citrobacter freundii can colonize the human gastrointestinal tract and is considered an opportunistic pathogen that causes nosocomial respiratory, urinary tract, and bloodstream infections in susceptible patients. According to the classification of multiresistant gram-negative pathogens issued by the German Commission for Hospital Hygiene and Infectious Disease Prevention at the Robert Koch Institute, C. freundii is considered a pathogen with minor outbreak potential, and there are only few reports of carbapenemase-producing isolates of this species [7] . Outbreaks caused by carbapenemase-expressing C. freundii (CPC) have been reported worldwide only sporadically, and none of them have indicated food as a point source of infection. Although it is not consistently associated with overt signs of infection, colonization with Citrobacter spp. may serve as a genomic reservoir of pathogen evolution, especially in terms of the acquisition of antibiotic resistance [8] .
In this retrospective observation, we describe, for the first time, a foodborne outbreak of CPC that occurred in 2016 in
METHODS

Outbreak Management
The unexpected accumulation of CPC-positive cases was immediately reported to the Department of Public Health of the city of Jena. A task force that included representatives of the Center for Infectious Diseases and Infection Control, the Department of Medical Microbiology, the Department of Public Health, and the Medical Executive Board was established immediately. All infection management activities were recorded in an "outbreak diary, " and weekly reports were conveyed to the state Department of Public Health. The search for the origin of the outbreak consisted of hospital-wide point-prevalence rectal screening and extensive screening of the kitchen environment and other suspected sources (Table 1) , including retained food samples, voluntary screening of kitchen staff, and an active search and screening of contact patients (defined as those who had shared a room with an identified case). All identified patients were isolated in single rooms and cared for using contact precautions (gown and gloves). After discharge, these rooms were treated with hydrogen peroxide vaporization in addition to conventional cleaning using disinfectants (details are available in the Supplementary Material). Six to 12 months after discharge, colonized patients were contacted and rescreened in the outpatient department by rectal swabbing. The follow-up was approved by the institutional review board. All rescreened patients provided written informed consent. (For details of the initial hospital and infection control setting, food transport and distribution guidelines, and identification and characterization of the outbreak strains, see the Supplementary Material.)
RESULTS
Outbreak Description and Source Identification
The outbreak of a fluoroquinolone-susceptible CPC expressing a VIM carbapenemase occurred between 8 February 2016 and 31 June 2016 within Jena University Hospital, which has 1490 beds distributed over 4 campuses. During the outbreak, 76 patients (42 men and 34 women) colonized with the pathogen were identified in wards in 14 departments. Average age of patients was 69 ± 15 years, and the average duration of hospitalization was 28.9 ± 22.2 days (mean ± standard deviation, respectively). Only 2 patients with CPC were detected during the previous year (2015); those patients showed a different resistance profile (ie, additional fluoroquinolone resistance). Those isolates were thoroughly characterized and used for comparative purposes in the outbreak reported here.
During a weekly routine screening on 8 February 2016, 2 patients with rectal colonization of CPC were identified in an intermediate care unit. Screening of the contact patients according to the hospital's standard operating procedure revealed an additional 12 of 14 patients with enteral colonization. A nosocomial origin was assumed as crude clonal analyses of mass spectrometry matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization timeof-flight spectra and resistograms revealed pronounced similarities between the first 9 outbreak isolates but no resemblance to the CPCs isolated in 2015. Detection of the pathogen in several wards across all campuses, spanning approximately 15 km, and the explosive start of the outbreak suggested a common source (eg, central units of radiology or endoscopy). The environments of all suspected sources were thoroughly probed, and operating procedures were examined for possible unknown hazards. However, all samples were CPE negative, excluding medical investigations as routes of dissemination. A large-scale probe of more than 500 specimens, including accrued food samples (according to German food hygiene regulation DIN 10526, Retained Samples in Mass Catering, accrued samples of each served dish must be stored frozen for at least 7 days), countertops, grease traps, and mixing machines, was undertaken in the central hospital kitchen (Table 1) .
Because CPC could not be identified in the food and kitchen samples, screening of all patients hospitalized on all 4 campuses was initiated. Due to the limited capacity of the diagnostic laboratory, this sampling was performed in each department on workdays only over a 3-week period. During screening, 41 additional colonized patients on different wards were detected. The screening also identified a patient who was admitted to the Department of Dermatology only 3 days prior (8 April 2016) and who screened negative on admission. This patient's menu was scrutinized, and the accrued samples of all noncooked or nonfried dishes (ie, 1 salad with yogurt dressing and 1 pudding) were microbiologically examined. For this probe, 15 specimens were taken from each of the 2 meals and cultured and microbiologically analyzed.
Growth of the outbreak CPC strain from both the salad with dressing and the pudding led to prompt cessation of serving hospital-prepared salads and puddings. Both the salad dressing and pudding were prepared using the kitchen mixing machine (500 liters), which was also used to prepare sliced-carrot salads (Figure 1) . The microorganism was isolated from another pudding that was prepared but not distributed because of the imposed product ban and from the drain plug of the machine after enrichment culture.
Repeated testing of vegetables subsequently delivered to the hospital showed that the presliced carrots had a high degree of contamination with C. freundii but without VIM, indicating a possible source.
Because the supplying company was in the neighboring federal state of Saxony, administrative assistance was requested from the corresponding department of public health. The first investigation prompted by that department yielded negative results; subsequent scrutiny revealed that no search for Citrobacter was conducted as national recommendations [9] confine screening to certain virulent foodborne pathogens (eg, Salmonella, Shigella, Escherichia coli, Campylobacter, and Yersinia), not including multidrug-resistant Enterobacteriaceae.
Microbiological Analysis
Multilocus sequence typing (MLST) analysis was performed for 11 patient isolates collected between 8 February 2016 and 5 
in all isolates showed only a single allelic variation in 1 strain; all the other strains were identical without any variation (Supplementary Table 1 ). These findings confirmed the spread of the clonal strain and the identification of a contaminated food as the colonization source. The MLST type has not yet been described in the medical literature, indicating an environmental source. One of the isolates recovered from the mixing machine and 1 from the pudding were sequenced using MinION. Both isolates harbored a class 1 integron carrying a VIM-1 metallo-β-lactamase (Figure 2) . The class 1 integron was located within a transposon element, which was located on a plasmid.
Further Characterization of the Foodborne Transmission Route
To investigate the route of transmission, temperature curves from packing to serving were assessed by placing temperature loggers in pudding samples and on trays ( Figure 3A) . We found that compliance with the hospital guidelines (ie, not opening the mobile induction trolley doors and leaving reheated dishes for up to 2 hours at room temperature before serving; see Supplementary Material) was poor in several wards. If the doors were not opened during reheating, the temperature of the pudding increased to >25°C within 2 hours and remained stable for hours if it was not delivered immediately. The growth experiment with the foodborne CPC isolates showed that while the bacteria did not multiply within 6.5 hours when incubated at 15°C (the temperature of the mobile induction trolley), they rapidly multiplied (16-to 34-fold) in the pudding, but not in the Mueller-Hinton (MH)-broth (2-to 9-fold), when the temperature changes identified during the meal delivery procedure were simulated ( Figure 3B ).
Countermeasures
The epidemiological development and the time points of the introduction of countermeasures, which were implemented immediately after the source of the outbreak was identified, are summarized in Figure 4 . The detailed countermeasures described in the following paragraphs were implemented.
A second mixing machine was purchased for the preparation of puddings and dressings. The mixing of presliced vegetables was not permitted in this machine; only the original mixing machine was to be used. The daily disinfection procedure for the original machine was intensified (soaking of the stopper in disinfectant; Supplementary Material). The subsequent preparation of 2 test batches of pudding yielded no growth of the outbreak strain. Presliced carrots of higher quality (acidified according to norms for child feeding) were obtained from a new supplier. Vegetables and sweet dishes were tested before and after preparation during the outbreak. Voluntary anonymous screening by the occupational health physician was offered to the kitchen personnel. Eighteen of 97 staff members were screened; none were colonized with the outbreak strain. A general screening of the kitchen personnel was rejected by the hospital's staff council. All patients being admitted and all patients pending transfer between wards were rectally screened for the outbreak-causing pathogen. After 4 weeks with no additional cases detected, this screening was limited to patients being admitted who had been hospitalized during the year prior to admission (including at our hospital). All nursing teams were retrained by the team leader on the hospital guidelines for food transport and delivery.
Despite these countermeasures, 19 additional cases were detected after the measures were implemented. All but 1 case could be explained by ongoing or prior hospitalization during the main outbreak period. In 1 case, the outbreak strain was identified in a newly admitted patient who had not been previously hospitalized. The patient was interviewed by an infection control physician who determined that the patient had performed the rectal probe herself and that the swab had fallen into the toilet during this procedure. Samples from the bowl were positive for the outbreak pathogen, whereas a second screening of the patient failed to provide evidence of colonization. Because the room had not been previously inhabited by carriers of the outbreak pathogen, the cause of toilet bowl contamination was unclear. However, further investigation revealed that a short-term substitute housekeeper had not been properly instructed on hygiene rules and had used a single cloth to clean the lavatories of the entire ward, including the isolation room that was inhabited by a colonized patient. Consequently, briefing on proper cleaning was repeated for the entire housekeeping staff, and all lavatories in that ward were disinfected.
Clinical Outcome and Persistence After Hospital Discharge
Fortunately, except for 1 case of infection (documented by positive blood culture), all affected patients were only colonized, with the pathogen isolated primarily from rectal swabs and, and in few cases, from wounds (n = 2), sputum (n = 1), and pharyngeal smears (n = 1). Only 1 blood culture taken from a healthy split-liver donor who presented with a fever after endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography in preparation for surgery tested positive for CPC. The patient received empirical medical treatment with piperacillin/tazobactam and completely recovered within 24 hours before the results of resistance testing became available. He was treated with ciprofloxacin for 7 days. In the remaining colonized patients, eradication occurred spontaneously. Follow-up examination of rectal swabs was conducted in 55 (of 74, 2 patients died during hospitalization) colonized patients Figure 3 . Growth experiments. A, The temperature changes during the distribution of meals (between 7:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.) on 2 different wards (solid and dotted lines), in the environment (temperature probe on the food tray, T out ), and in the pudding (T in ). B, Bacteria counts (in colony-forming units [CFU] 7 mL) of the isolates obtained from patients (n = 3, light gray bars) and the kitchen (n = 2, dark gray bars) under different conditions: t 0 , inoculum; T 15°, after growth in pudding at 15°C for 6.5 hours; T curve , after growth in pudding for 6.5 hours according to the temperature curve T in obtained in (part A); and T MH after growth in MH for 6.5 hours according to the temperature curve T in obtained in (part A). The means and standard deviations of the CFU/mL are shown for the tested isolates in 3 replicates each. who consented to this procedure after discharge from the hospital or were readmitted within the follow-up period. The average interval between follow-up exam and hospital discharge was 155 ± 94.9 days. Only 1 patient was positive for CPC after 6 months; long-term persistence could not be tested because the patient died. DISCUSSION This is the first described CPC outbreak with food identified as the source. The epidemiological registry at outbreak-database.com [accessed 10 August 2017] and published data reveal that in 2 of 11 reported outbreaks caused by (noncarbapenemase-expressing) Citrobacter spp., foods (infant formula [10] and organic fertilizer-treated parsley [11] ) were identified as the source of nosocomial spread.
For the outbreak reported here, we assume that the pathogen was imported via organic (eg, manure) fertilizer-contaminated presliced carrots, as the unknown-to-date MLST type and lack of fluoroquinolone resistance fit the characteristics of an environmental strain rather than those of a typical nosocomial pathogen. Consistent with our assumption, in a statement published in 2011 [12] , the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment warned of the presence of enteral pathogens in ready-to-eat crudités, with specific emphasis on sliced carrots and cabbage.
CPC colonized inaccessible parts of the mixing machine and found optimal cultivation conditions during the subsequent preparation of temperate, sugar-containing dishes (eg, junket, pudding). This insight suggests that the search for putative pathogens in swab samples from instruments may be obscured by low sensitivity, thus requiring cultivation under "enriched" conditions such as blood culture. The rapid identification of the source, swift introduction of targeted countermeasures, and vigorous implementation of infection control and surveillance made it possible to contain the outbreak within approximately 4 months. As a continuous measure, raw sliced root vegetables are used less frequently and are purchased from another supplier, and separate mixing machines are used to prepare salads and dressings and puddings.
It is worth mentioning that certain federal-state-specific infection control regulations (different standard search panels for food-related pathogens) may have hampered verification of the contaminated fresh produce. Therefore, we recommend securing administrative assistance from regional and federal health authorities early in the course of outbreak management.
The isolation of CPE is a very alarming event; however, the VIM-1-expressing CPC in the outbreak described here failed to cause infection in the vast majority of colonized patients. This is in contrast to another foodborne outbreak of an extended-spectrum β-lactamases-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae in Spain in 2011, where 22.4% of the patients were infected [13] . The single patient in which the pathogen produced signs of systemic infection was successfully treated with piperacillin/ tazobactam. Spontaneous eradication of the microorganism was documented in all colonized patients who participated in the follow-up (74.3%) within 6 months. Moreover, none of the patients suffered from CPE infection during the follow-up period, indicating the low infection risk of this strain. Nevertheless, plasmid-borne carbapenamases may potentially be transferred to more virulent nosocomial pathogens. In a recently reported outbreak in an 800-bed hospital in Germany, 132 enterobacteria of different species harboring the same KPC-2-containing plasmid were described [14] . That outbreak lasted for 12 months, and 12 weeks of intense investigations were required to detect KPC-2 enterobacteria in the kitchen. However, it remained unclear how the nosocomial pathogens were imported into the kitchen. It was hypothesized, but not confirmed, that plumber snakes used to clean drain pipes in both patient rooms and the canteen kitchen may have been responsible. Indeed, hospital sinks and the related plumbing have been reported as sources of CPE. However, this route of pathogen dissemination for the CPC outbreak described here is rather improbable as probing of the plumber snakes failed to detect the causal pathogen. Also, the past, the outbreak strain had never been detected in our hospital despite consistent screening at admission and in the intensive care units. In our opinion, the most likely route of transmission and colonization was the contaminated pudding, which demonstrated fast reproduction of the pathogen after it was heated up.
Class 1 integrons, such as the one identified in the outbreak strain, are associated with the nosocomial spread of gram-negative bacteria. A total of 70 of 163 randomly selected gram-negative isolates from 9 European hospitals carried a class 1 integron [15] . These integrons can incorporate resistance gene cassettes through their integrase (intI1) via site-specific recombination [16] . Mobilization by both a transposon and a conjugative plasmid allows the highest potential dissemination of antibiotic resistance genes in antibiotic-rich environments such as hospitals. Although class 1 integrons usually carry only a few cassettes and their molecular origin is still unknown, more than 100 antibiotic resistance cassettes are known to be associated with this integron type [17] . Class 1 integrons are associated with nosocomial isolates, but the time point at which the VIM-1 gene was acquired by the outbreak strain is unknown. In repeated testing, we only found VIM-negative C. freundii in the carrots. Incorporation of the class 1 integron into the environmental C. freundii strain may have occurred inside or outside the hospital; however, this cannot be clearly stated due to the prevalence of this integron.
In summary, we show that an explosive increase in CPE contamination may have been caused by a foodborne source; suggest that raw vegetables must be considered as a putative pathogen repository; underline the importance of appropriate cooling, transport, reheating, and distribution of meals; and indicate that tests of nonorganic surfaces are limited by low sensitivity, which may be improved by additional overnight cultivation in appropriate media. Furthermore, we suggest expanding regulations for food safety, which currently require screening for foodborne pathogens only according to their virulence (eg, Salmonella spp., Campylobacter spp.), to include bacteria that harbor fast-spreading, broad spectrum-resistant determinants.
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